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1. Introduction. 
 
The Civil War that ravaged Spain between 1936 and 1939, after the rebellion of a sector 
of the army against the democratically elected government of the Second Republic, left a 
trail of atrocities difficult to quantify. While both sides committed violations, the 
repression on the rebels’ side, headed by General Francisco Franco, was systematic and 
especially cruel. Their victory on 1st April 1939 marked the beginning of a dictatorial 
regime –rooted on Franco’s leading figure-. After the very intense persecution of political 
opponents for several years in the aftermath of the civil war, the dictatorship was built on 
repression of dissidence, restriction of freedoms, and a narrative based on myths that 
would enhance Franco’s role as the saver of the nation. Francoism lasted until Franco’s 
death in 1975. Deprived of its foundational leader and therefore of its sense, the 
dictatorship was followed by a transitional process that culminated with the adoption of 
the democratic constitution in 1978. A year before, an amnesty law had been passed as 
the expression of the political forces’ “pact of silence” or “pact to forget”.  
 
Today there is still a lack of public discourse recognizing the unbalanced treatment that 
Franco’s victims suffering has had. There have also being limited discussion regarding 
their legal rights as victims. This article explores this reality by taking a closer look at the 
elements proposed by Druliolle (2015) in his framework to analyse the politics of 
victimhood.1 Such framework is articulated around two dimensions: the definition of 
victims (as self-definition, legal definition and socio-cultural factors) and the struggle for 
legitimacy (p. 321). Our chapter makes a strong emphasis on how socio-cultural factors 
may determine legal definitions and self-definition of victims. As Druliolle states, victim 
is primary a legal concept and it is the law -therefore the state- who defines who is a 
victim. Therefore, it is key to legally identify victims, because from this categorisation 
derive more than a status, but a set of rights. At the same time, self-definition is critical 
to boost the struggle for justice and legal recognition. In Druliolle’s words, “individuals 
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and groups decide whether or not “victim” is a relevant identity, and thus whether they 
engage in the struggle for legal recognition” (p. 322). Nevertheless, sociocultural factor 
may be so strong as to ultimately determine both definitions of victims and, consequently, 
their struggle for recognition and justice. 
We argue that in Spain official narratives and amnesty not only resulted in the denial of 
the legal status of victim but largely in the refusal to self-define as a victim too. At the 
same time, we suggest that there might be another element in the definition of victims: 
social definition, that is to say, others’ perception of someone as a victim that deserves 
recognition. In Spain, self-definition might not have been as decisive in the struggle for 
justice as social definition. The next section analyses how the socio-political and legal 
structure that followed the civil war deprived Franco’s victims of their status as such. This 
was not only due to their exclusion from the legal category of victims but also to their 
depiction in the social narrative of the historical events during the Second Republic and 
the war as well as to their own (self-imposed) social exclusion through silence.   
2. The civil war and the repression that followed: (heroic) victims and 
(defeated) villains.  
 
There is little agreement on casualty figures during the war, hundreds of thousands in any 
event (Juliá, Casanova, Solé i Sabaté, Villarroya & Moreno, 1999, p. 411; Preston, 2011, 
p. 17).2 While both sides committed atrocities, the repression on the rebels’ side was 
systematic and especially cruel. On the last month of the war, upon the rebels’ victory, 
20,000 civilians were executed and many more died of starvation and sickness in prisons, 
concentration and labour camps. Half a million refugees fled to France where they were 
placed in detention camps. With the outbreak of World War II and the Nazi occupation 
of France, thousands of Spanish republican refugees were deported to Nazi concentration 
camps where over 5,000 died.  
 
The dictatorship that followed was –as Aróstegui Sánchez (2009) has put it (p. 41)- a 
continuation of the civil war itself through all sort of repressive mechanisms. In an 
impoverished country, lacking essential infrastructure and with the spread of hunger and 
sickness, post-war repression disposed those on the losing side of their status of victims. 
The most severe repression took place in the years right after the war and during what is 
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commonly referred to as the “triennium of terror” (1947-1949).3 Prisons were filled 
beyond capacity– there were an estimated 280,000 prisoners after the war, most of them 
held in horrible conditions (Ríos Frutos, Martínez Silva, García-Rubio & Jiménez, 2008, 
p. 141). Ten thousand prisoners are estimated to have died of hunger, sickness and 
inhuman treatment and beatings. Labour camps were also common; according to one 
estimate, there were 190 camps (Ríos Frutos, et al. 2008, p. 141).4 Arbitrary arrests and 
executions were frequent, as well as summary trials before military judges, with no 
guarantees and no right to appeal, and death sentences were routinely imposed. Franco’s 
repression resulted in more than 130,000 enforced disappearances (Espinosa Maestre, 
2010, pp. 77-78). 
 
Repression was carried out through the establishment of a repressive apparatus and legal 
system, persecution, purges at all institutional levels, and the imposition of an official 
narrative of exaltation of the regime and their heroes. A complex normative system was 
articulated to dismantle the democratic republican legal system, to prohibit political 
parties and trade unions, to persecute any manifestation of political, religious and 
ideological dissidence and to establish a totalitarian system (Aragoneses, 2009b, pp. 123-
159). Freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly were abolished (Ortiz 
Heras, 2004, p. 219). Civil and public life was co-opted through -among other things- 
public positions being reserved for those who had fought on the Franco side and friends 
of the so-called Movimiento Nacional (“National Movement”). The judiciary, for 
instance, was co-opted and sympathizers were appointed as new judges, prosecutors and 
court staff. Properties belonging to pro-Republican groups and organizations were 
confiscated.  
 
Besides, propaganda was an essential tool to justify repression. Francoism built an official 
narrative where the war was portrayed by the victors as inevitable given the political 
instability during the last years of the II Republic (Reig, 2006, pp. 97-104; Tamarit, 2013, 
pp. 42-43). Franco had undertaken a “crusade” against communism to defend the Western 
Christian civilization (Southworth, 2008, pp. 529-530).5 Historians have demonstrated 
how the narrative of the episodes of the war provided a bias account, based on myths and 
the manipulation of facts and figures.6 The scale of the violations committed by Franco’s 
army was downgraded and even negated.7 On the contrary, the violence of the Republican 
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army was exalted and given much centrality in the accounts of what had happened during 
the war.  
 
A story of heroes (the winners) and villains (the defeated) was thus created, resulting in 
a clearly differential legal and social treatment among victims of the civil war, with the 
consequence of denying the latter of legal rights of rehabilitation and reparation. The 
category of “victim” was reserved to those who fought on or sympathised with Franco’s 
side, although without providing a legal definition.8 Indeed, during the first years of 
Franco’s regime most of the bodies of those dead in support of Franco and his rebellion 
were located, exhumed, identified and given burial in their places of origin or in the Valle 
de los Caídos (the “Valley of the Fallen”),9 a pantheon built to commemorate victory.10 
They were exalted, elevated to the category of martyrs, and their memory turned into 
national patrimony (Tamarit, 2013, p. 42). Their families were given special status and 
reparations schemes.  
 
On the contrary, Article 1 of the Law on Political Liabilities (1939) declared “politically 
liable” –and therefore deserving punishment- those who had contributed to the “red 
subversion” before the war or had opposed the Movimiento Nacional after the outbreak 
of the civil war, either through specific acts or through serious passivity. Otherwise said, 
the democratically elected government of the Second Republic was branded as 
subversive, and the Republic and its sympathizers, civil servants and ordinary citizens 
that had not enthusiastically supported the rebellion were criminalized. On this basis, 
instructed by the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court initiated in 
1940 the Causa General (“General Cause”), to prosecute the crimes committed during 
the “red domination” (Decreto, 1940). Consistently, the corpses of those killed in battle 
or assassinated away from the battlefield by Franco’s troops and his supporters remained 
in mass graves in graveyards or on the side of the roads. At the same time, their families 
were not only deprived of any compensation but suffered further repression, wherein they 
were marginalized and were denied access to decent jobs.  
 
Coming back to the three factors emphasized by Druliolle to define victimhood (legal 
definition, sociocultural factors and self-definition), we sustain that the legal framework 
and the official narrative -attributing the status of victims only to the winners while 
criminalizing Franco’s opponents- conditioned victims’ self-definition and their struggle 
5 
 
for legitimacy. Given the legal and socio-political context, victims had two options: action 
or passivity. Choosing one or the other would condition self-definition. At this point, we 
should distinguish between two groups of victims: one including those that actively 
fought against Francoism, the other encompassing those who did not enter active political 
resistance (for example, relatives of those directly repressed by Franco, but also victims 
who had no political affiliation or those that abandoned political opposition after the war). 
Those who fought the regime clandestinely and tended to self-defined as fighters for 
freedoms and democracy, or similar, but not as victims. Those who avoided political 
resistance sought to avoid further repression by hiding their condition as a victim, if they 
ever self-defined as such.11 This group is particularly interesting insofar they resorted to 
silence as a protective mechanism, as a conscious coping strategy during the dictatorship 
(Labanyi, 2009, p. 24).  In a way, they publicly denied their condition of victim. Privately, 
“the screen of silence, fear and self-censorship”, particularly “in local, rural contexts” 
(Ferrándiz, 2008, p. 177), makes it hard to know whether they self-defined as victims.12 
In the light of how events developed in the next decades, it rather seems they did not, as 
we will discuss later.   
3. The democratic transition and the missed opportunity to recuperate the 
status of victims.   
 
The death of the dictator on 20 November 1975 deprived the regime of its inspirational 
character and meaning and propitiated a change towards democracy. Nevertheless, 
Francoism was never fully dismantled, but rather adapted to the new political regime. 
Democracy being rather inevitable, a reformist elite of the old regime would be in control 
of the process, although opening to negotiation with some opposition parties (Gallego, 
2008, p. 411). Indeed, during the transition the most important rules of the new 
democratic system –among them, the Amnesty Law- were adopted by consensus between 
the Francoist reformist and the moderates groups of the democratic opposition (Aguilar, 
2012, p. 318).  
 
The existing climate of political violence during the transition,13 the prevailing traumatic 
memory of the political violence that preceded the civil war and the shared guilt over the 
atrocities which had been engraved in the population over forty years of propaganda and 
manipulation of historical facts, are instrumental in why democratic stability took 
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precedence over all other objectives, including accountability for past crimes (Aguilar, 
2012, pp. 318-322).14 Regarding victims, the democratic transition was a missed 
opportunity to recognise them such legal status and develop true politics of victimhood. 
Sociocultural factors were central to understand the lack of a legal definition, the 
difficulties for self-definition, and why many victims did not struggle for recognition at 
that time.  
 
The cornerstone of the new political system was the Amnesty Law of 1977, which even 
preceded the new Constitution (approved by popular referendum in 1978). Amnesty’s 
main aim was to benefit those convicted of political crimes because of their opposition to 
Franco’s regime. It had widespread social backing and was overwhelmingly supported 
by political parties in the Parliament.15 Through amnesty, the political forces steering the 
transitional process formally gave effect to their agreement not to dwell on the past, but 
“to look forward.” In a more or less implicit way, they also ratified a “pact of silence” 
over crimes committed by Franco and his regime during and after the Civil War (Tamarit, 
2013, p. 62). Whether we accept the argument that silence during the transition was a 
consequence of a tacit pact, “pact of silence” or not,16 the reality is that Spain went 
through an unwritten political “pact of forgetting”. The relationship between the roles of 
silence and of forgetting17 is an important element to consider in the Spanish transition, 
as it helped building a new official narrative that excluded discussion on victimhood. The 
very first months and years that followed the death of the Dictator saw a profuse number 
of demonstrations, publications and debate on the past, the war and its consequences. 
There was voracity for knowledge and history in the population (Juliá, 2011, pp. 24-28). 
However, the process of approval of the amnesty regulations, concluded by the first 
elected Parliament of the democracy, brought what Juliá has described as the first pact of 
the transition: a pact on the past that, ultimately, prevented it to be used as an instrument 
in the political fights of the present (Juliá, 2011, p. 39). During the debates to approve 
normative instruments to declare amnesty, there were recurrent references to the need to 
forget the past to focus on the present, by all political parties.18 Whether we can describe 
this as a pact to silence or to forget is debatable, but ultimately it brought a sidelining of 
victims’ legitimate struggle for recognition. 
 
Amnesty was presented as a milestone in the reparation and the rehabilitation process of 
those punished or discriminated for political reasons during the Franco years. In addition, 
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amnesty was justified as a tool to prepare the country as a whole for shared life and 
reconciliation, repairing the wrongs of the past and allowing society to forget and 
concentrate on the future. But the 1977 Amnesty Law was not a law for victims. The word 
“victim” is not mentioned a single time in the law, and was never mentioned during the 
discussions at the Congress (Congreso de los Diputados, 1977). It was a law to pardon, 
thus confirming the criminal nature of the behaviour of those who had opposed Franco.19 
Furthermore, it provided protection to perpetrators, implicitly acknowledging the 
legitimacy of their atrocities. The law contained two provisions that effectively 
guaranteed impunity for the crimes committed by Franco’s regime. Article 2.e) 
established amnesty for the crimes committed by the authorities and public order agents 
when investigating and prosecuting political crimes, whilst Article 2.f) contained a 
general clause of amnesty for crimes committed by civil servants and agents of the public 
order against the enjoyment of human rights. This pre-constitutional law is still in force 
and has never been repealed.20 Instead, in recent years it has been repeatedly invoked, 
both in political circles and by the judiciary in order to prevent any potential judicial 
review of the thousands of crimes committed during the forty years of repression.   
 
Indeed, there was a popular (including many of Franco’s victims) claim for amnesty. 
However, amnesty was supposed to benefit those who were in prison or had been 
prosecuted for political crimes, the underlying spirit being to release those who had been 
deprived from liberty for fighting for their freedom.21 Nevertheless, not every victim of 
Franco’s repression was a political prisoner: many of those who had suffered the worst 
repression in the aftermath of the Civil War, or their relatives, or those persecuted for 
other grounds than political (for example, homosexuals) did not get any advantage from 
the amnesty. Victims of human rights violations that did not qualify as political crimes, 
such as the relatives of those executed during the Civil War and the Dictatorship and in 
general any victim of crimes committed by Franco’s public forces (for instance, torture 
or rape) were not to expect any acknowledgment of their condition as a result of the 
amnesty. Instead, the official narrative underlined by the Amnesty Law tacitly indicated 
that their contribution to the transitional pact should be a duty to remain silent and forget, 
what was perceived as necessary for political stability. The abovementioned victims were 
never consulted on the terms of amnesty and the transitional pact. However, their part on 
such pact, their contribution to the construction of democracy was expected to be silence 
about crimes committed during the Civil War and the Dictatorship by Franco’s regime or 
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they risked being accused of wanting revenge. It was not hard though to contribute that 
way to the new democratic project: after forty years being silent, they were well used to 
do so. 
 
At the same time, any attempt to get justice or reparation done out from the official 
schemes or to go beyond the accepted claim for amnesty would not only be tagged of 
“revanchist”, but also find either a strong opposition or contempt from public authorities. 
Initiatives such as the proposal in 1978 to create a Civic International Tribunal against 
Francoist Crimes ended up with 19 of its promotors (who were politicians of the II 
Republic, judges, lawyers, professors, young militants, journalists, writers, artists) 
arrested.22 According to the authorities, they were participating in an illegal meeting 
supported by terrorist group FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota).23 In 
the late 70s relatives of republican victims privately exhumed some mass graves. But, as 
Aguilar and Ferrándiz (2016) point out,  
they were carried out without any kind of technical (e.g. forensic, 
anthropological), judicial or economic support; […] they took place in the 
absence of any official memory policies; […] they had very limited (and often 
no) media exposure and […] they did not give rise to broader debates 
regarding Spain's tortuous relationship with its traumatic past.  
 
These initiatives, according to Silva Barrera (2016), did not catch on due to victims’ fear, 
to the lack of political will from political parties in the Parliament, and to the impact of 
the coup d’état of 23 February 1981, which worked “as a paralyzing conditioned reflex, 
an order to keep self-repressive behaviours from the dictatorship unalterable in 
democracy” (pp. 19-20).   
 
Besides amnesty, few measures to address the past regime and dismantle its institutional 
and legal architecture were adopted in the early years of the transition. As a direct 
consequence of the nature of a transition made from within, there was no abrupt 
ideological or personnel break with the previous system (Aragoneses, 2009a, pp. 61-78). 
Consequently, there was no institutional reform for the vetting of former public officials 
in civil and military institutions in influential positions. The exit from public and official 
life of those closer to Franco’s regime was facilitated mainly through a progressive 
succession of early retirements among the military and judicial personnel. Often, 
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however, political, military and religious elites continued to occupy important spheres of 
public life, including the judiciary, the army and the police. The transition also failed to 
eliminate Francoist symbolism. Monuments, names of many streets and public spaces 
kept on honouring the “heroes” of the regime, what perpetuated for a long time the 
distinction between victors and vanquished.  
 
The 1980s saw the beginning of a slow succession of restorative measures, which were 
however not undertaken as part of a comprehensive scheme of reparation. Some of them 
included: reintegration of civil servants and military in their former positions, with right 
to their lost promotions but not to their lost income; recognition of the right of the heirs 
to receive state pensions and elimination of administrative sanctions that prevented them 
from accessing state benefits; specific benefits for the so-called niños de la guerra 
(“children of the war”) –children exiled without their parents that had remained in other 
countries; and devolution of goods confiscated to institutions such as political parties and 
trade unions, but not to individuals.24 
 
In all, the transition failed to change the sociocultural factors (particularly criminalisation 
and silence) that had turned self-definition of Franco’s victims into self-censorship.  It 
also did little to provide them with a generalised (not fragmented) legal status. All this 
determined the lack (or, at least, the great weakness) of their attempts to justice and 
recognition in the first decades of democracy.  
4. Struggling for justice and recognition.     
 
By mid-90s some political discussion on the Civil War and Francoism began at the media, 
among scholars, and even at the Parliament.25 Humlebaek (2004) holds that it was as if 
all of a sudden a broader public became aware of the existence of a pact to silence or to 
forget the past. According to him, this was a first symptom that the pact was weakening 
and political uses of the past were changing (p. 158). At the same time, in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s a process of revisiting the past and defying the silence that had 
surrounded the individual stories of many of the victims of the war was initiated by a 
group of private citizens “searching for their dead.” Since then, thousands of bodies have 
been exhumed, all thanks to the work of private groups and individuals, on occasion at 
their own expense, and with no official sanction.26 This movement is sustained not only 
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by those who directly suffered repression but mainly by their grandchildren (born at the 
end of the dictatorship or early years of the transition), who struggle to understand what 
happened to the lost members of their families, whose names and stories were buried in 
silence while they were growing up.  The absence of the second generation, or rather their 
limited role as spectators, is directly related to the imposed silence during the dictatorship 
to which we referred above (Labanyi, 2009, p. 25).27 According to Ortiz Heras (2006), to 
inoculate in the generation that led the transition a strong “patriotic guilt” concerning the 
war, implying their co-participation in that big “historical mistake”, together with fear 
and even mistrust to the own exercise of freedoms, was one of the greatest successes of 
the ideological socialization of Francoism (p. 182).  
 
The exhumations of mass graves encouraged survivors to talk. Ferrándiz (2006) has 
suggested that the difficulties they find in articulating previously untold experiences is 
due not to a blocking or failure of memory, but to the habits of silence acquired over so 
many years.28 The reaction of the grandchildren generation against their elders’ silence 
was crucial in igniting and driving a process –now referred to as “recovery of historical 
memory”- that started with the search for bodies (Labanyi, 2009, p. 25). This has been a 
process of breaking through the use of history by Franco’s regime to create an “official 
memory” about the time that preceded the civil war, the conflict and the collective guilt 
over it reflected in the long silence which preceded the transition and was ultimately 
consolidated by the search for amnesty. As argued before, the victims on Franco’s side 
were key to this memory, their worship being a core element to this construction (Castro, 
2008, p. 165)29. Recovering historical memory has also meant attempting to break 
through the pact of silence during the transition, allowing for a new narrative of consensus 
over the generalized choice of silence to settle (Gálvez Biesca, 2005, pp. 35-36). The 
process of recovering historical memory has also attempted to contribute to a renewed 
process of negotiation over a new-shared collective memory. Overall, the claim has 
drifted to a broader process of transitional justice that never took place in Spain in a 
comprehensive way (Álvarez Junco, 2009, pp. 44-45; Capellà i Roig, 2008), including 
not only the search for truth, but also for justice and reparation.  
 
Most important, as far as Franco’s victims are concerned, this process was a turning point 
to embrace their identity as such. With their grandchildren endorsing them and the 
physical evidences of Franco’s atrocities exposed, they found, as Ferrándiz (2006) puts 
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it, “the resonating chamber they had lacked for over 60 years. […] In this process, the 
deep silence imposed by Franco’s regime on the victims of its terror in the post-war years 
was markedly shaken” (p. 10). In his opinion, with the exhumations, “survivors were 
suddenly powerfully anchored in the most explicit evidence of the violence – the corpses 
themselves” (p. 10). The symbolism in opening the graves, but also the backing of 
younger generations, the attention of media, and in general a certain social 
acknowledgement of what they had endured –a “social definition” of their victimhood- 
seem to have underpin the consciousness of the injustice suffered and their condition as 
victims.  
 
This breakthrough in self-definition was critical in the struggle for justice and recognition. 
Particularly, relatives of those killed in the civil war and dictatorship seem to have timidly 
assumed their own victimhood, although in their narrative they mostly keep presenting 
themselves as victims’ relatives.30 One should not disregard either the impact of 
international human rights law on this new approach. Advances in this field31 arguably 
have strengthened victims’ self-definition in Spain, insofar international law provides 
with a legal definition of victim and therefore with a set of rights, thus adding legitimacy 
to the struggle for recognition at the domestic system. Nowadays, relatives of those 
executed and/or enforced disappeared are indeed victims, according to international 
human rights law.32 Instead, by the time the events took place this legal definition did not 
even exist. As Bassiouni (2006) has shown, international recognition of victims’ rights is 
the result of a process that started after World War II. By the time of the Spanish civil 
war, Spaniards could not claim for their international recognised human rights, as “human 
rights violations” did not exist as a legal concept.  
 
The beginning of the exhumation process led to an intensification of political pressure to 
open public debate and a sustained movement on the parts of the victims to establish their 
legitimacy. In 2002, Congress passed an institutional declaration reaffirming society’s 
duty to give moral recognition to the victims of the civil war and the subsequent 
repression (Congreso de los Diputados, 2002). The Declaration, however, declined to 
assign responsibility for the war and the Franco regime was not condemned. The electoral 
victory of the Socialist Party in March 2004 brought a propitious climate for further 
initiatives to recover memory. It established an Inter-ministerial Commission for the 
Study of the Situation of the Victims of the Civil War and Francoism that should 
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recommend measures to compensate and provide for the moral and juridical rehabilitation 
of the victims of political repression (Real Decreto, 2004, Art. 2). 
 
The struggle for legitimacy was accompanied by great efforts to acquire legal status of 
victim, mainly through judicial recognition. In 2006 claims reached the Juzgado Central 
de Instrucción (“Central Investigating Court”) of the national court Audiencia Nacional, 
demanding a judicial investigation of the thousands of enforced disappearances. The 
claim did not seek individual criminal accountability (Chinchón, 2008, p. 1388) but rather 
a judicial enquiry over the fate of the missing. In 2008, Central Investigating Judge 
Baltasar Garzón accepted his jurisdiction over the alleged crimes, which included illegal 
detention without news of fate (enforced disappearances) committed in the context of 
crimes against humanity between 1936 and 1951 (Juzgado Central de Instrucción Nº 5, 
2008). His ruling admitted, though, that the exhumations could not be done directly under 
the competence of his central court, but instead required the cooperation of the local 
courts at the places where graves were located. Some of them assumed the delegated 
competence to order the exhumations at local level, but most refused to do so on the basis 
of either the Amnesty Law or the applicability of statutory limitations to the alleged 
crimes –despite the permanent character of enforced disappearances33-, and 
systematically taking for granted that the disappeared were dead, without further 
investigation. 
 
In the meantime, some of the measures in the report adopted by the Inter-ministerial 
Commission (Comisión Interministerial para el estudio de la Situación de las Victimas de 
la Guerra Civil y del Franquismo, 2006, p. 22) were included in the Law for the 
recognition and broadening of rights and establishment of measures in favour of those 
who suffered persecution or violence during the civil war and the Dictatorship, passed in 
2007. This law, also known as the Ley de Memoria Histórica (Historical Memory Law, 
hereinafter HML) intended to reckon with the past. However, it was firmly grounded on 
the consensus-to-look-forward narrative –in its own wording, in the spirit of 
reconciliation and concord that had inspired the transition (preamble). The legislative 
process shows that there was no political consensus over its need, and that the 
conservatives considered that it undermined the pact of the transition, aimed to impose a 
unique and official truth, and was “clearly harmful for the national coexistence” 
(Congreso de los Diputados, 2007, pp. 14628-14629).34  
13 
 
 
According to its preamble, the HML aims to repair victims, consecrate and protect the 
right to personal and familiar memory, encourage the constitutional, values and promote 
the knowledge and reflection about the past to prevent similar intolerance and human 
rights violations. However, its text and the institutional responses fall short of them. 
Regarding the recognition of victimhood, the main feature of the HML is its meagre use 
of the term “victim(s)”: in the whole text, the word barely appears nine times. In fact, 
there is no explicit legal definition of “victims”. Implicitly, Article 1.1 considers a victim 
any person that suffered any punishment or violence on political, ideological or religious 
grounds during the Civil War and the Dictatorship. Article 2.1 generally recognizes and 
declares the radically unjust character of such punishment or violence. Victims can be 
granted a “declaration of reparation and personal recognition”, although the law expressly 
states that such declaration does not entitle them to compensation, and declarations will 
be issued only upon request (LMH, 2007, Art.4). This has been particularly criticized by 
victims and by jurists for shifting the responsibility for reparation from the State to 
victims –it is victims’ burden to prove the condition and to take the initiative for their 
legal rights to be recognized (Gil Gil, 2009, p. 97; Martin-Ortega & Alija Fernández, 
2015, pp. 97-114).  
 
There is a timid acknowledgement of the victims’ and their relatives’ right to personal 
and family memory. This way, the state is merely guaranteeing a right to talk without 
shame and fear, but it does not ensure that their stories enter the public domain. No 
officially-endorsed truth commission is considered. No public policy on memory is 
designed. Reparations continue to be incomplete and the measures lack a true restorative 
character, as they are not based on the recognition of the existence of violations of human 
rights, but rather on some kind of compensatory or equating mechanism (Gil Gil, 2009, 
p. 97; Chinchón, 2007, pp. 181-183). On the other hand, the HML implicitly endorses the 
1977 Amnesty Law by not declaring it repealed, and therefore maintains the rule of 
impunity and the lack of officially-sponsored investigation of the facts.  
 
In contrast with this somehow propitious legislative climate, in 2008 the Criminal 
Chamber of the Audiencia Nacional ruled the court incompetent to continue the case on 
Franco’s enforced disappeared and closed the judicial avenue for victims (Audiencia 
Nacional [Pleno de la Sala de lo Penal], 2008). In a dramatic turn of events, two right 
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wing organisations initiated legal proceedings in the Supreme Court against the judge 
arguing that by assuming jurisdiction over the disappearances he had knowingly issued 
an unjust decision, a crime under the Spanish Criminal Code.35 Paradoxically enough, the 
trial against Garzón was the only time so far where victims of Francoism had the chance 
to tell their stories before a court (see, for example, “Dos víctimas de Franco,” 2012). 
Both claims were later dismissed (Tribunal Supremo [Sala de lo Penal], 2012).36  
 
The path to justice closed at the domestic level, the victims resorted to the European Court 
of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR). Nonetheless, the result was equally deceiving. In 
2012, a chamber of the ECtHR adopted an inadmissibility decision in the first case 
concerning an enforced disappearance during the Spanish Civil War discussed therein, 
Antonio Gutiérrez Dorado and Carmen Dorado Ortiz v. Spain.37 In their application 
before the ECtHR, Gutiérrez Dorado and Dorado Ortiz invoked Articles 2 (right to life), 
3 (prohibition of torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 5 (right to 
liberty and security), 8 (right to private and family life) and 13 (right for an effective 
remedy before national authorities for violations of rights under the Convention) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950). Focusing on the enforced disappearance 
of Mr Dorado Luque, the ECtHR considered that the applicants had waited too long 
before bringing an application before it. According to the court, they should have 
introduced their complaints without undue delay once it had become apparent that the 
mechanisms provided by the State no longer offered “any realistic hope of progress in 
either finding the body or accounting for the fate of their missing relative in the near 
future” (Antonio Gutiérrez Dorado and Carmen Dorado Ortiz v. Spain, para. 39). 
 
Based on a very strict application of the principle of due diligence in reaching the court, 
the ECtHR declared the complaint inadmissible. It is questionable that it did not take into 
consideration how the specific social circumstances –and very centrally their own lack of 
self-recognition during the repression and the transition, as well as the lack of recognition 
of their status as victims in domestic law- had determined the victims’ behaviour, limiting 
their agency and ultimately their capacity of diligence in judicial procedures.  
 
Efforts to “get justice done” have not stopped in recent years but on the contrary victims 
have looked for other fora where to achieve their goal. The most remarkable one was the 
complaint filed in Argentina by several victims of crimes committed between the 
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beginning of the Civil War and the first democratic elections in 1977 (including enforced 
disappearances and tortures) (Querella 4591/2010, 2010). As far as victimhood is 
concerned, this initiative is interesting insofar claimants are not only relatives of enforced 
disappeared during or immediately after the war, but also political activists and opponents 
persecuted and repressed during later years of the dictatorship.  This is a turning point 
concerning not only the judicial struggle for justice and recognition but also self-
definition as victims of those who for a long time had defined themselves as fighters for 
democracy. The Argentinian judge admitted the complaint and, although Spain has so far 
refused to extradite the alleged perpetrators, her decisions have already had an important 
effect: following a request of international cooperation issued by the Argentinian judge, 
on 19 January 2016 took place the opening of the first mass grave under the authorisation 
of a Spanish judge.  Whether the “Argentinian querella” will be successful or not, it will 
definitely not be the last attempt to achieve justice.38 Now that victims have assumed their 
condition as such, there seem to be more options and strength in the struggle for justice 
and recognition.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Victims of the Spanish Civil War and Dictatorship are on a long road to justice to revert 
their many years of ostracism and lack of recognition. Following Druliolle’s three levels 
of recognition (self-definition, legal definition and socio-cultural context) for the 
condition of victim, this chapter has argued that the latter has been critical in Spain. The 
imposed official memory, together with criminalization, led Franco’s victims to a 
subsequent self-imposed silence (or at least lack of self-definition as victims). The 
democratic transition, with the Amnesty Law as its cornerstone, ratified a pact of silence 
or of forgetting within the Spanish society. The official narrative corroborated the 
narrative of criminalization of Franco’s victims. Indeed, no legal definition of victim was 
articulated, while self-definition was very limited.  
 
Well into democracy, the launching of a movement driven by grandchildren to recover 
“historical memory” resulted in the opening of mass graves. The symbolic power of 
exhumations, together with the social backing or social recognition of their victimhood, 
empowered victims to assume their condition and struggle for legitimacy. With timid –
and failed- legal attempts to achieve a definition of victims, they have resorted to judicial 
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procedures, although obstacles to access them –particularly the Amnesty law- remain. 
Consequently, inaccessibility of courts has resulted in the denial of the status of victims’ 
and therefore play an integral part of the politics of victimhood in Spain today.   
 
The Spanish case reveals the need for policies of victimhood that take into account social 
factors that may have led to self-censorship.  Victims’ silence should not mean they lack 
legitimacy to claim for their rights. In Spain, this was particularly critical when it came 
to the admissibility of claims before the ECHR. On the contrary, victims’ vulnerability 
towards social pressure should be overcome either by legal definitions that legitimates 
their identity and repair their suffering, or by social recognition that backs their struggle. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 In this particular article, Druliolle focuses on the disparity of recognition between Franco’s victims and 
victims of terrorism. 
    
2 Preston provides the figures of 300,000 men dead in the war fronts and 200,000 civilian, men and women, 
dead far away from the front  (Preston, 2011).  More conservative estimates calculate 140,000 people killed 
away from the battlefield during the war and first decade of the dictatorship –until 1950- (Juliá, et al. 1999). 
 
3 After that, there were less mass scale human rights violations, but persecution and torture were frequent. 
Towards the end of the regime, repression was more localised in regions with strong national identity. 
 
4 The last camp, Los Merinales (Sevilla), closed only in 1962. 
   
5 Among others, an attempt to legally justify the rebellion as a crusade can be seen in J. de la C. Martínez 
(1938), pp. 209-210. 
 
6 Regarding this topic, see generally Viñas (2012). 
 
7 See e.g., Viñas (2012) or Tapia (2012) on the negation of responsibility over the Guernica bombardment. 
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8 See an example of such use of “victim” in Orden de 4 de abril (1940). 
 
9 For initiatives to honour the fallen for Franco see Castro (2008). 
 
10 Thousands of bodies of republican victims were unburied without the knowledge or authorization of their 
families and without identification, and reburied latter in the Valle de los Caídos (Gil Gil, 2009, p. 42). 
     
11 In their accounts, they often saw themselves simply as relatives, the victims being the death or 
disappeared ones, or as people who suffered reprisals (represaliados/as). See e.g., Fraser (1979), p. 223; 
Junquera (2013), pp. 39-43. 
 
12 An important consequence of this is what Labanyi (2009) calls “habits of silence” (p. 24): in Spain, 
difficulty to find words to articulate previously untold experiences is due to the habits of silence acquired 
over many years. 
 
13 On violence during the Transition, see e.g., Sánchez (2010). Focusing on its victims, see Escudero (2016), 
pp. 125-136. 
 
14 See generally Aguilar (2002 and 2008). In the first decade of democracy there were over 600 politically 
related violent deaths perpetrated both by the security forces in the course of police repression of street 
demonstrations and by extreme left, independentist and right wing organisations (figures in Gil Gil, 2009, 
p. 45).  
  
15 The Amnesty Law was the first law adopted by the first democratically elected parliament and the last of 
the instruments used from 25 November 1975 to provide pardons and amnesty for political crimes. The law 
was approved by the majority of congress (296 votes in favor, 18 abstentions, 2 votes opposed and 1 invalid 
vote (Congreso de los Diputados, 1977, p. 974). The abstention came from Alianza Popular, the right-wing 
party mainly composed by those who had held important positions during the dictatorship, latter 
transformed in today´s Partido Popular (Aguilar, 2012, p. 318). 
      
16 Loureiro (2008), for instance, considers it a poor metaphor, grounded on an old-fashioned concept of 
power as an all-controlling force wielded by an elite, in which the populace is confined to a passive or 
merely reactive role. The transition however, was characterized by a continuous give-and-take between 
power and resistance, with the many political and popular forces in action striving to reach a balance that 
would satisfy the majority. The constant strikes and popular demonstrations that caused a stream of steady 
concessions by Franco’s heirs were precisely one of the transition’s most notable features (p. 225). 
 
17 We consider that terminology nuances are important in this point. Here we deliberately distinguish the 
use of forgetting and oblivion to highlight the difference between the Spanish olvidar as a conscious or 
unconscious process and olvido, as a place where things that have been forgotten remain. 
 
18 See for example the analysis of the political negotiations and normative proposals in Juliá (2011), chapter 
1). 
 
19 As Dianne Orentlicher put it in its report on updated principles on human rights and the fight against 
impunity:  
 
[i]nsofar as it may be interpreted as an admission of guilt, amnesty cannot be imposed on individuals 
prosecuted or sentenced for acts connected with the peaceful exercise of their right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. When they have merely exercised this legitimate right, as guaranteed by 
articles 18 to 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 18, 19, 21 and 22 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the law shall consider any judicial or other 
decision concerning them to be null and void; their detention shall be ended unconditionally and 
without delay (U. N., 2005, pple. 24.c). 
 
20 In 2016, the parliamentary group Grupo Confederal de Unidos Podemos-En Comú Podem-En Marea 
filed a proposal to modify the law in order to exclude amnesty over torture, enforced disappearances, 
genocide and crimes against humanity (Congreso de los Diputados, 2016). The Comission of Justice of the 
Spanish Congress rejected the proposal (Congreso de los Diputados, 2017). 
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21 This was a general trend in the 70s, when amnesty for political prisoners became a symbol of freedom 
(U. N., 1997, para. 2). 
 
22 See press articles “Los promotores” (1978); Campelo (2013). 
 
23 See the official communiqué in press article “Detenidos  los  asistentes” (1978). 
 
24 For a comprehensive list of legal instruments adopted between 1976 and 1999 establishing these and 
other measures, see Gil Gil (2009), pp. 57-72. 
 
25 See, for example, Congreso de los Diputados (1995). 
 
26 Between 2000 and 2016, over seven thousand six hundred exhumations had taken place (Etxeberria, 
2016). 
 
27 There are of course examples of second-generation people (born in the late 1950s) who chose to break 
the silence that their parents maintained, sometimes until their deaths. Labanyi (2009) suggests this was 
done out of a retrospective sense of guilt at having done nothing to alleviate their parents’ suffering under 
the dictatorship (p. 25). The silence of the second generation has received practically no attention from 
scholars.  
   
28 Ferrándiz has highlighted how, in other cases, the capacity for detailed recollection is extraordinary in 
people talking for the first time about what they suffered in and after the war (Ferrándiz, 2006, p. 10). 
 
29 Junquera (2010) even asserts that historical memory was an invention of Franco (pp. 16-17). 
 
30 See e.g., the testimonies collected in Junquera (2013). 
 
31 See generally U. N. General Assembly Resolution 60/147 (2005). 
  
32 See in particular Article 24 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (2006). 
 
33 Enforced disappearances are a serious violation of human rights of a continuous nature until the fate of 
the disappeared person is determined. Accordingly, no statutory limitations apply before that moment. See 
Article 8.1.c) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (2006). 
 
34 Instead, some local nationalist and left wing parties were disappointed over the timid measures. In their 
opinion, they did not go far enough in the establishment of a framework to pursue truth, justice and 
reparation (Congreso de los Diputados, 2007). 
 
35 The Supreme Court decision to accept jurisdiction over the claims has been severely criticized at political 
level but also considered unsustainable from a legal point of view (Chinchón & Vicente, 2010). 
 
36 The Supreme Court established that the Judge was not criminally responsible but had acted wrongly, as 
he should had applied the Amnesty Law and abstained from ordering the investigation of the 
disappearances. 
     
37 The applicants, Antonio Gutiérrez Dorado and Carmen Dorado Ortiz (who died in 2010, before the 
decision was issued), were grandson and daughter respectively to Luis Dorado Luque, a Member of the 
Spanish Parliament belonging to the socialist party that had been forcibly taken away on 18 July 1936 by 
military forces in circumstances that have not yet been fully established. The applicants had no reliable 
information as to their relative’s fate after 28 July 1936. In early August 1936 the body of a person who 
according to the autopsy had died as a result of firearm injuries with serious wounds to the brain and liver 
was discovered with documents with Dorado Luque’s name in his pockets. Initially registered as Dorado 
Luque in the civil registry, some days later the judge decided that there was not enough evidence regarding 
his identity, so they made a new entry in the civil registry was made stating the body was that of an 
“unknown man”. In 1981 her widow initiated a procedure for voluntary declaration of death in order to be 
entitled to widow’s benefits. In 1993 a court confirmed that Mr Dorado Luque had disappeared and that his 
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fate and whereabouts were unknown and ordered that his death (established on 30 July 1936) be recorded 
in the civil registry books. In May 2006 Carmen Dorado brought a criminal complaint that was dismissed 
on the basis of statutory limitations. The appeal court and the Constitutional Court confirmed the initial 
decision. In December 2006 Ms Dorado was among the applicants filing the complaint before the Audiencia 
Nacional on which the decision on lack of jurisdiction was issued in 2008. 
 
38 For instance, on 3 March 2007, the town hall of Barcelona announced it would file a complaint against 
one of the jurists in the court-martial that sentenced Salvador Puig Antich to death (Ajuntament de 
Barcelona, 2017). Puig Antich was the last person executed with garrotte vil in the dictatorship.  
